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SUMMARY
The disclosure of information on the granting of stock options as part of 
senior managers’ compensation packages can be a cumbersome and patchy 
process in terms of both regulatory compliance and public accessibility. 
Closing the gaps to make the reporting and accessing of data less unwieldy 
and more timely, efficient and accurate, should be a priority for securities 
regulators 
Firms are required to disclose the issuing of stock options to their highest-
level executives in their annual information circulars. Slight additions made 
to the information provided in the circulars, such as stock option grant dates, 
would greatly improve corporate transparency. Insiders also need to be 
educated on their duty to file, as they bear a fair amount of the responsibility 
for the problems in the system. 
Insiders’ lack of awareness about compliance contributes to discrepancies 
between insider disclosure and company disclosure, and creates information 
gaps. Misfiling, failure to file, and late filing of data — which can be a chronic 
problem — further hamper the disclosure process. Add to this the issue 
of limited accessibility created by a frustrating lack of linkage between 
databases and a paucity of online searchability capacity. 
This paper’s research shows that compliance levels are quite high in regards 
to reporting of information in proxy circulars. However, 12 per cent of stock 
option awards are not made public outside of the circulars, with 10 per cent 
of awards to CEOs, nine per cent to CFOs and 15 per cent to VPs going 
unfiled. The incidence of unfiled reports also includes 22 per cent of insiders 
for whom stock options are the only award. Equally worrisome is the fact that 
26 per cent of insiders have at least one option award that goes unreported 
and nearly eight per cent of insiders never file. Some 34 per cent of insider 
awards are filed with information that differs from the data reported in the 
firm’s information circular. Confusion and procedural ignorance about compliance on 
the part of insiders contribute to such discrepancies. 
The System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR), the continuous 
disclosure database that firms use, cries out for modernization. Not only does its 
archaic reporting system limit its accessibility, but it functions separately from the 
database insiders use, the System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI). Linking 
the two databases would streamline insider filing requirements, increase compliance 
with insider disclosure, and improve the audit and compliance function of the securities 
regulators.
The financial penalties for non-compliance or irregularities should be an incentive 
for both insiders and issuers to educate themselves and ensure they are meticulous 
in producing error-free, timely data and in making those data public. Unfortunately, 
enforcement is inconsistent. Currently, penalties tend to be applied only if another 
serious regulatory breach accompanies the misfilings, late filings or chronic non-
filings.
Canada’s disclosure system needs fixing and streamlining in order to achieve the 
highest level of transparency on executive compensation. Some of these fixes are 
simple, others may be costly, but if improvements are not made, the system’s integrity, 
along with shareholder and public confidence, risk being seriously compromised.
1I. INTRODUCTION
Securities regulators have long been concerned with insider trading. Insider trading occurs 
when individuals with access to confidential information about a company exploit that 
information for financial gain. That financial gain typically comes through the acquisition 
or disposition of various securities related to the company, including through the trading 
of the company’s stock or through the possession of rights to acquire that stock (e.g., 
stock options). It is commonly held that such insider trading erodes public confidence in 
financial markets and investors’ expectations of profit, which raises the cost or impedes the 
availability of new capital and ultimately hinders new economic activity and growth.1 
In order to protect investors and restore market efficiency, securities regulators need 
to combat insider trading. There are typically two regulatory responses to curb insider 
trading: criminal sanctions and insider disclosure. Criminal sanctions work by increasing 
the costs associated with being caught engaging in insider trading, whereas insider 
disclosure works by communicating obligations and increasing the probability that someone 
engaging in insider trading will be caught. 
What are disclosure rules? Disclosure rules require corporate executives and other 
individuals with potential access to non-public information to file public reports concerning 
securities held in their company (known as insider disclosure). The idea behind these rules 
is that an individual who knows that the details associated with their acquisitions and 
dispositions of securities are publicly available and subject to scrutiny will be less likely 
to engage in insider trading. Of course, disclosure rules will only be effective if insiders 
actually comply with them, yet little is known about insider disclosure compliance in 
Canada.2
One of the difficulties in investigating compliance is selecting a methodology and then 
obtaining access to appropriate information that will allow you to determine if the rules 
are being followed. One popular method of exploring compliance is to use third-party 
reporting and data matching, as is often used in the field of tax compliance. The method 
simply requires that the third-party provided information be accurate and contain much 
1 
There is also some debate as to whether insider trading laws achieve these objectives. The seminal work in this area would 
be H. G. Manne, 1966, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, (New York: The Free Press). Manne essentially argued that 
not only does insider trading do no harm, but it also provides a social benefit. In addition, A. Bris, “Do Insider Trading 
Laws Work?” European Financial Management 11(3), 2005, 267-312, shows that prohibiting insider trading makes it even 
more profitable; and U. Bhattacharya and H. Daouk, “When No Law is Better than Good Law,” Review of Finance 13(4), 
2009, 577-627, demonstrate that no securities law is better than a case where the securities law is not enforced.
2 
W. McNally and B. Smith, “The Effect of Transparency on Insider Trading Disclosure,” Canadian Public Policy 36(3), 
2010, 345-58, and M. Chang and Y. Lim,“Late Disclosure of Insider Trades: Who Does it and Why?” Journal of Business 
Ethics 133, 2016, 519-531, have investigated some of these questions by examining the accuracy and timeliness of insider 
disclosure of equity trades in Canada and Australia respectively. For Canada, McNally and Smith imputed reporting 
errors based on observing daily share information and found that errors have tapered in recent years and disclosure has 
become timelier. They still recommend a system for real-time disclosure and that fines for misleading and late disclosure 
be imposed. For Australia, Chang and Lim compared trading information reported by insiders to the Australian Securities 
Exchange to that reported in the insider’s firm’s annual report. They find that about six per cent of insider reports contained 
discrepancies which they interpreted as meaning that the insiders were late in filing their trade reports. They recommend 
improved governance measures to address this so-called late filing behaviour. The Ontario Securities Commission, 
OSC Staff Notice 51-726: Report on Staff’s Review of Insider Reporting and User Guides for Insiders and Issuers, 2016, 
(available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/sn_20160218_51-726_review-insider-reporting.
pdf) also recently completed an investigation into compliance with disclosure rules that employs a similar methodology 
detailed in this paper. The OSC found that 15 per cent of insider reports contained material deficiencies; the report 
recommends educating issuers and reporting insiders about their disclosure requirements.
2of the same information available in the matched data. A key advantage of using third-
party reporting is that it broadens the types of questions that can be answered, particularly 
determining the extent and intensity of compliance, and allows for an increased ability to 
contextualize probable causes of errors and omissions. A disadvantage is that third-party 
reporting of information is often not available.
In Canada, third-party reporting of insider trading does not exist for most securities, but is 
available for stock option awards to select insiders at Canadian publicly traded companies. 
The third-party reporting for stock options happens as a result of continuous disclosure 
rules. Continuous disclosure rules require that publicly traded companies provide a detailed 
breakdown of certain insiders’ compensation, including stock option awards, in their annual 
detailed information circular. These circulars are required to be made publicly available and 
the information provided in them is highly accurate for several reasons. First, information 
circulars are provided to shareholders in advance of annual or other shareholder meetings 
and contain the necessary data to inform shareholder votes, including “say on pay” votes. 
To provide misleading information in proxy circulars would subject the corporation to 
lawsuits based on solicitation of proxies through false or misleading statements. Second, 
information circulars are also prepared by the corporation which has full access to detailed 
records related to executive compensation and stock option awards including the dates on 
which the grants of options were approved. Third, these filings are subject to regulatory 
scrutiny including random audits by securities regulators and the consequence of disclosure 
irregularities can be material.
Not only is there the opportunity to investigate compliance with disclosure rules using 
stock option awards, but there is also policy interest in the timely and accurate disclosure 
of these compensation instruments. One hundred per cent of Canada’s largest public 
corporations granted stock options to their executives (Klassen 2002, 41) and stock options 
have also become the single largest component of compensation among chief executive 
officers (CEOs) at large publicly traded companies in Canada. In addition, the existing 
stockpile of stock option awards among Canadian insiders is substantial. According to 
Mackenzie (2012, p. 8) the top 100 Canadian CEOs: (1) were the recipients of stock option 
awards which value averaged $3.22 million; (2) held unvested stock options valuing $549 
million (a per capita amount of $5.29 million); and (3) held vested stock options valued at 
$2.0 billion. Finally, there are concerns about stock option granting practices, including 
(1) “spring loading” or issuing grants immediately before the release of “good news”; 
(2) “bullet dodging” or issuing grants immediately following the release of “bad news”; 
and (3) “backdating” or the act of choosing a date for a stock option grant after that date 
has occurred but claiming to have granted the options at that earlier date in order to take 
advantage of the historical price performance of a company’s stock. Since the Canadian 
Securities Administrators have clearly noted that disclosure requirements for stock 
option grants limit these improper dating practices (Insider Reporting Requirements 
and Exemptions, Companion Policy 55-104CP [CP 55-104], s. 1.3(2)), studying actual 
compliance with these requirements is important to understanding their deterrence 
efficacy.3
3 
S. B. Avci, C. A. Schinpani, and H. N. Seyhun, “Ending Executive Manipulations of Incentive Compensation,” Journal of 
Corporation Law (forthcoming 2016) provide evidence that executives continue to employ these manipulative dating practices.
3To investigate compliance with insider disclosure rules in Canada, I exploit this availability 
of third-party reported information. I collect information on stock option awards from 
a sample of Canadian public companies’ annual information circulars for the period 
1996-2011. I then compare this information to that reported by the individual insiders 
in their disclosure reports. The resulting data allow me to investigate the following 
questions: Do insiders file their insider reports? Are their filings timely? Are their insider 
reports accurate? Have recent changes to reporting requirements made any difference in 
compliance rates? Overall, I find that while the majority of insiders properly and accurately 
file their disclosure reports, a concerning minority fail to file, file after the required 
reporting period, or file inaccurate information. I consider the consequences of this finding 
and suggest ways to improve the quality of insider reporting in Canada.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides a brief history of 
insider reporting; Section III outlines the current insider and continuous reporting system; 
Section IV discusses data collection and matching process; Section V reports on and 
discusses the results of the data analysis; Section VI offers recommendations for future 
improvements to reporting mechanisms, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INSIDER REPORTING IN CANADA
Disclosure rules were first embodied in securities regulation in the U.S. as a direct result of 
the stock market crash of 1929. Canada, however, did not adopt disclosure rules until 1966, 
principally after two events.
The first event was Shell Oil’s 1962 offer to acquire shares of Canadian Oil Companies, 
Limited, which included concerns that insiders with prior knowledge of the deal had 
traded on that information and made significant profits. (Armstrong 2001, 224) At the time, 
however, there was nothing illegal about distributing insider information or acting on this 
information. (Armstrong 2001, 223-224) Nonetheless, the Shell Oil case garnered plenty 
of attention,4 including a lame duck inquiry that uncovered ample evidence of suspicious 
behaviour but with no ability to take any action (Armstrong 2001, 224-225). The Shell Oil 
case and the resulting inquiry led in part to the 1963 formation of the Attorney General’s 
Committee on Securities Legislation (hereinafter “the Kimber Committee”) whose primary 
concern was to consider the problem of insider trading and the degree of disclosure 
(Ontario 1965, 6) and make recommendations for changes to securities regulations.
The second event was the Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) scandal (also known as the Windfall 
scandal) that erupted in 1964 (Davies 1975, 218-220), which had a direct influence on the 
recommendations made by the Kimber Committee in 1965 (Ontario 1965). The details of 
the TGS case were aptly summarized by Fleischer (1965) as follows:
The company made an extraordinary mineral discovery in 1964 on its Canadian 
property at Timmins, Ontario. Before information about the development was released 
to the public, several officials of the company purchased shares of its stock on the open 
4 
As Armstrong (C. Armstrong, Moose pastures and mergers: The Ontario Securities Commission and the regulation of 
share markets in Canada, 1940-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 224) notes “partly on the nationalistic 
grounds that the only integrated oil company under Canadian control was being taken over by a multi-national and partly on 
account of growing concerns about corporate concentration as a result of such mergers.”
4market and one also advised his friends or associates to acquire the stock. Furthermore, 
the board of directors, without knowledge of the importance of the new discovery, 
issued stock options (exercisable at the then-current market price of the stock) to certain 
key management officials, who were aware of the Timmins find. Subsequently, the 
company issued a press released discounting as unfounded rumours that there had been 
a significant ore strike. Several days later, news confirming the extent and significance 
of the strike was released to the public and the price of the Texas Gulf Sulphur stock 
increased substantially. Before the end of the press conference at which this news was 
made public, certain directors instructed their brokers to purchase the company’s stock 
… (1273)
The Kimber Committee acknowledged that both market efficiency and ethical trading are 
necessary requirements for effective financial markets (Ontario 1965, 10). With the Shell 
and TGS cases fresh in their minds, the Kimber Committee recommended a system for 
both insider and continuous disclosure intended to restore investor and public confidence in 
the securities industry. 
Insider disclosure (ID) placed a reporting requirement on an issuer’s insiders when they 
acquire ownership or trade in the issuer’s securities. ID was seen as an effective way to 
address the problem of insider trading because “the insider who knows that his trading  
will become public knowledge will be less likely to engage in improper trading” (Ontario 
1965, 10).
CD included requirements for both periodic disclosure (e.g., annual financial statement) and 
timely disclosure (e.g., material change reports). One required periodic disclosure report 
is an annual detailed proxy information circular. As noted by the Kimber Committee, “in 
these days of large public companies with numerous shareholders, who as a rule do not 
have a voice in management of the company, the proxy assumes major significance in the 
control of companies” (Ontario 1965, 49). The committee stated that periodically sharing 
knowledge with investors who would otherwise not be privy to the corporate management 
increases investor confidence directly and economic growth indirectly.
These two disclosure recommendations were first introduced in Ontario in 1966 and later 
introduced in all remaining provinces.5 Since their introduction, disclosure rules have been 
periodically revised to make them more effective and timely and to respond to events or 
technological advances in the market.6
5 
Until 2001, the Canada Business Corporations Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44, s.127) included reporting requirements for 
insiders. Such a requirement was consistent with requirements in the U.S. at the time and historically with other Canadian 
provinces. In 2001, Bill S-11 (an Act to Amend the Canada Business Corporations Act and the Canada Cooperatives Act and 
to Amend Other Acts, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, 2001) made sweeping changes to the Act, including to insider reporting 
rules. According to the government of Canada, this change was made to avoid unnecessary duplicate filing; insiders would 
still be required to comply with the reporting requirements of provincial legislation.
6 
There have been a number of calls for a national securities regulator as opposed to the series of provincial regulators 
that currently exists. The origin for these calls dates back to 1979 when there was an extensive review of Canadian 
securities legislation which culminated with the publication of Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada. For 
a comprehensive explanation of the background of this ambitious but ultimately ill-fated early proposal for a national 
securities regulator for Canada, see Philip Anisman, “The Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada: Purpose and 
Process,” 19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1981, 329. 
5III. RULES REGARDING THE DISCLOSURE OF STOCK OPTION AWARDS
This section summarizes the disclosure requirements over the period of interest, namely 
1996-2011. It provides answers to the following question: who is required to file disclosure 
reports, what information needs to be included in these reports, when the reports have to 
be filed, how the reports are filed, to whom the reports are filed, and what the reporting 
penalties are. The requirements for insiders are described first, followed by the disclosure 
requirements in the issuer’s information circular.
Disclosure by Insiders
Compton et al. (2011) provide a recent and detailed account of the insider disclosure 
regulations and requirements in Canada, which I will summarize here as they currently 
apply to the reporting of compensatory stock option awards. 
Who must report? The term “reporting insider” was introduced in Insider Reporting 
Requirements and Exemptions, NI 55-104, s. 1.1(1) (23 April 2010) [NI 55-104] and details 
who is required to file insider reports.7 A reporting insider generally includes the CEO, 
CFO, COO, director, or a person responsible for a principal unit of a reporting issuer. The 
insider, however, may designate an agent who can “file information on behalf of insiders” 
(CSA 2008, 93).
When must they report? These reporting insiders are required to publicly disclose option 
awards within a certain period of time from the grant date, called the filing deadline. The 
filing deadline has changed three times since 1996. Until Dec. 13, 1999, insiders were 
required to disclose options awards within 10 calendar days of the end of the month in 
which the options were granted. For example, if an award was made on March 8, 1997, the 
insider was required to submit a report of that award by April 10, 1997. From Dec. 14, 1999 
to Oct. 31, 2010, the insider report had to be filed within 10 calendar days of the grant date. 
Since Nov. 1, 2010, the reporting period has been five calendar days.8 
What must they report? As set out in NI 55-104, s. 1.4(6) insiders must report the details 
related to all financial instruments, including all stock-based compensation instruments. 
With respect to stock options, which are included in these reporting requirements, the 
insider must provide the security designation, which in the case of typical employee stock 
option awards is “Options”, and the nature of the transaction, which is “Grant of Options.” 
The insider must also provide the date of the transaction, which for stock option awards 
is the date when “the legal steps necessary to authorize the issue of the options have been 
completed” (Torys 2006, 2) (hereinafter the “grant date”). The number of options acquired 
7 
Although the insider reporting obligations set out in NI 55-104, s.9.2 do not apply in Ontario, this definition of reporting 
insider also governs the insider reporting obligations of the Ontario Securities Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 107.
8 
This still puts Canada at a longer filing window than that in the U.S. where stock option awards must be filed by insiders 
within two business days.
6must be provided, along with the exercise price,9 the currency at which they were awarded, 
and the options’ expiration date.10 
How must they report? Since June 9, 2003, all insiders must file their reports on the 
System for the Electronic Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI), which is a public web-based 
system for “the transmission, receipt, review and dissemination of insider reports and 
related information” (System for the Electronic Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI), NI 55-102, 
s, 1.1 (June 13, 2008) [NI 55-102]). Under SEDI, as soon as the insider files their report, the 
report is publicly available.
SEDI replaced an antiquated paper-based reporting system. Under this system, the insider 
filled out a paper-based form and sent (mailed or faxed) the form to the appropriate 
securities commission. The securities commission passed these forms on to a third party 
(e.g., the OSC used Micromedia) for data input, which was then transmitted back to the 
appropriate securities commission who then eventually published the information in a 
publicly available periodic securities bulletin; for the OSC, insider reports were published in 
its weekly securities bulletin (OSCB). Under the old paper-based system, the public had to 
wait until the reports were published. In addition, the OSCB did not report expiration dates.
In theory, the move to the SEDI web-based disclosure system should better contribute to 
achieving the goals of insider disclosure (market efficiency and ethical trading) assuming, 
of course, that the information filed is timely, complete and accurate. Investors have 
access to insider reports as soon as they are filed, which may lead to better knowledge and 
greater investor confidence. SEDI’s accessibility may also encourage ethical behaviour by 
making it easier for investors and other members of the public to view the insiders’ actions. 
The increased visibility of insider activities may discourage insiders from engaging in 
questionable practices.
To whom must they report? With the advent of SEDI in 2003, insiders need only file 
their reports on this system. Prior to SEDI, reporting insiders were required to report to 
the securities commission in every jurisdiction where the security issuer was a reporting 
issuer. This meant that every reporting insider at an issuer who is listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX and TSX-Venture Exchange) must, at a minimum, file insider reports 
to the OSC. Obviously, SEDI has eased the complication of filings in multiple provincial 
jurisdictions.
What are the reporting penalties? The Ontario Securities Act was recently amended to 
include s. 76(3.1) which prohibits a person who possesses undisclosed material information 
from recommending trades or encouraging others to trade in securities of the issuer. While 
there are no specific penalties for filing erroneous or misleading reports, all of the provinces 
do have general provisions that make it an offence, punishable by fine or imprisonment, to 
break securities laws. For example, paragraph 122(1)(c) of Ontario’s Securities Act (RSO 
1990, c. S.5, s. 122(1)(c)) provides: “Every person … that contravenes Ontario securities 
law is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $5,000,000 
9 
Under the SEDI system, there are two places where the options exercise price may be reported: the “unit price of exercise 
price” column or the “conversion or exercise price” column. When collecting the data, I am careful to examine both 
columns, and entries in either column are recorded.
10 
Insiders must also provide their closing balances. For insider reports filed on the SEDI, the closing balance is automatically 
provided. Obviously, if a report is not filed or misfiled, which affects this balance, the balances reported on SEDI will be 
incorrect.
7or to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years less a day, or to both.” Provincial 
securities commissions also have the power to order administrative penalties, the maximum 
of which is usually between $1 million and $5 million. However, in practice, these laws 
have not been applied to improper insider reporting. Indeed, I am not aware of any case 
where an individual was charged with producing misleading insider reports. 
Only a handful of provinces have penalties for late filing (CSA, n.d.a.). In British Columbia 
(B.C. Reg. 196/97, 1997), Manitoba (Man. Reg. 491/88R, 1998) and Ontario (Fees, O.S.C. 
Rule 13-502, (2 April 2010), s. 4.3(3)), the penalty for late filing is a relatively modest fine 
of $50 per day, and in Manitoba and Ontario this fine is capped at a maximum of $1,000 
per firm (in which the individual is an insider) per year. Quebec (OC 660-83, 1983) levies 
a fine of $100 per day up to a maximum of $5,000. In addition, Alberta (since March 30, 
2004) and Quebec (since Feb. 17, 2003) publicize the names of late filers online. Compton 
et al. (2011, 484-487) discuss the efficacy of late filing penalties in Canada, noting that “the 
extent to which these penalties deter late filing is uncertain” (485). It is also important to 
note that additional enforcement actions against late filers have only come about as part of 
other more serious breaches of securities law (e.g., Hinke, Re, 2006 Carswell Ont. 3023, 29 
O.S.C.B. 4171).
Disclosure by Issuers (Continuous Disclosure)
This section details the third-party reported information that occurs through the continuous 
disclosure requirements on issuers. This is the information that will be collected and 
matched to the insider disclosure to determine the level of insider compliance with 
disclosure rules.
Who must report? In general, a reporting issuer must publish an annual detailed 
information circular to its shareholders. A “reporting issuer” is a corporation that has issued 
securities under a prospectus or has its securities listed on a regulated stock exchange, such 
as the Toronto Stock Exchange.
When must they report? The annual information circular is prepared in advance of annual 
shareholder meetings that are held after the end of the issuer’s financial year.
What must they report? In the 1980s and 1990s, most jurisdictions in Canada added 
rules for the inclusion of information on executive compensation in the annual information 
circular. Initially, reporting issuers were required to provide compensation information on 
the five highest paid officers in the aggregate. In 1993, Ontario required reporting issuers to 
include a breakdown of that compensation, following similar changes in the U.S. (Johnston 
and Rockwell 2006, p. 98). 
Detailed reporting of executive compensation subsequently spread to all the provinces 
and is currently encompassed in NI 51-102F6 (See NI 55-102). NI 51-102F6 covers only a 
handful of officers referred to as Named Executive Officers (NEOs), which are the CEO, 
CFO, and three other most highly compensated officers provided that their individual total 
compensation exceeds $150,000. If an individual becomes a NEO part way through the 
reporting year, the issuer must still report the compensation for that individual for the entire 
reporting year.
8Issuers are expected to provide details of all options granted to NEOs in the reporting year 
and to disclose these specifics in a prescribed format. Since 2008, the required reporting 
format, with some degree of latitude, is show in Figure 1 below. The number of securities, 
exercise price, expiry date, and the value of options at the time of the award must be 
reported. Some companies also report the date on which the options were granted and the 
market price of the stock on the date the options were granted, but this information is not 
required.11 If the amounts provided in the table are not in Canadian dollars, then the issuer 
must disclose the currency used. If the amounts provided are converted into Canadian 
dollars, the issuer must disclose the currency exchange rate and the methodology used to 
convert the compensation.
FIGURE 1 STOCK OPTION COMPENSATION TABLE FORMAT REQUIREMENT
 
Source: Form 51-102F6, page 12
An important point to note is that the reporting requirement, as alluded to in the heading 
to column b in the figure, is actually related to the number of outstanding option awards 
for the reporting year. That is, only the number of securities related to unexercised options 
need to be reported. This means that if a NEO receives a stock option award in a reporting 
year and all or a portion of the options vests and the insider chooses to exercise the vested 
options in the reporting year, then the number of securities reported in the annual proxy 
will be the total award minus the exercised options. This is a curious practice as it means 
that the annual proxy may not accurately reflect the total compensation for NEOs if a stock 
option award in a reporting year also vests and the insider elects to exercise the vested 
options. While the typical practice is for options not to begin to vest until a year after an 
award is made, there is no requirement for this and there are examples of stock option plans 
and awards in my sample that do not place such a vesting limit on the option awards. This 
is an important complexity that will have to be kept in mind during the data matching 
process.
Each company must also provide the objectives of the compensation program. In the case 
of stock options, this usually means outlining long-term goals like performance-enhancing 
11 
It is interesting that issuers are not required to report the grant date of the option award, given that it represents the date 
that the executive received compensation. While the expiration date along with the information in the stock option plan can 
be used in most cases to back up the grant date, the grant date seems to be pertinent information related to the executive 
compensation that is being reported in the annual proxy report.
9incentives and employee retention. Companies must also disclose information related to 
stock options, specifically “the process the company uses to grant options to executive 
officers including the role of the compensation committee and executive officers in setting 
or amending any option program. State whether previous grants of options are taken into 
account when considering new grants” (NI 51-102, Appendix B, para. 2.3). The process 
used to grant options is usually disclosed by outlining the specifics of an option plan. This 
includes the term of options, the way in which price is determined, and the schedule at 
which options vest and expire. This information will be important for verifying or imputing 
the stock option award grant date. 
How and to whom must they report? Since Jan. 1, 1997, all reporting issuers have been 
required to file their CD documents, including the annual information circular, on the 
System for the Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR). SEDAR’s purpose 
was to create a public electronic forum where companies could file required reports without 
filing paper documents in multiple jurisdictions. As per the SEDAR Filer Manual (CSA 
2010, 53-54), prior to September 1999 issuers were allowed to submit their documents 
in Word, WordPerfect or PDF formats. Since then, only PDF documents are allowed. In 
addition to posting the report on SEDAR, the information circular must also be provided to 
all shareholders. 
What are the reporting penalties? To provide misleading information in proxy circulars 
would subject the corporation to lawsuits based on solicitation of proxies through false or 
misleading statements. These filings are subject to regulatory scrutiny, including random 
audits by securities regulators, and the consequence of disclosure irregularities can be 
material.
Summary
Table 1 summarizes the information that is reported for stock option awards through 
disclosure requirements and whether the information is required or optional. Column A 
details the information that must be provided in insider reports and column B matches 
that to what is provided in the third-party information circular reports. The only piece of 
information that is not consistent across the two sources of information is the grant date 
which does not need to be provided in the annual information circular. However, some 
issuers do voluntarily provide that information or it can be imputed from the additional 
detail provided in the information circular regarding the stock option granting practices 
followed by the issuer. 
10
TABLE 1 INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE INSIDER REPORTS AND ANNUAL INFORMATION CIRCULAR
Insider Reports
A
Issuer’s Annual Information Circular
B
Source Weekly OSCB SEDI SEDAR
Insider/NEO Name Required Required Required
Type of Security Awarded Required Required Required
Award or Grant Date Required Required Optional
Number of Securities Awarded Required Required Required
Exercise Price Required Required Required
Expiration Date No Required Required
Currency Required Required Required
Disclosure Date Publication Date Filing Date No
The table shows that the inclusion of stock option award information in both ID and CD 
requirements provides an opportunity to assess the accuracy of insider trading reports 
through the use of third-party reporting and data matching. The approach and the data 
available will allow me to determine compliance with reporting rules, particularly the 
extent and intensity of failing to file the required insider reports. I can also determine 
whether the information provided by insiders through ID is accurate, what specific 
information is inaccurate, and what actions might redress these inaccuracies in the future.
IV. DATA COLLECTION AND MATCHING
The data collection process is carried out through three steps. First, the information on 
stock option awards from the annual information circulars is collected. Second, I use the 
additional information the issuer provided to verify the reported information. Third, I use a 
sample of obtained stock option awards to search for and obtain the matching information 
from the insider reports.
Step 1: Information on Stock Option Awards Contained in the Issuer’s 
Annual Information Circular 
To keep the data collection and matching to a reasonable scale, I began by defining a 
sample of issuers. I originally defined a sample of 121 companies that were trading on the 
TSX as of Dec. 31, 2010. I then accessed any information circulars filed for the companies 
from the inception of SEDAR through to 2012, searching by company name. Because proxy 
circulars report on information over the preceding reporting year, this means I obtained 
information on stock option grants from 1996 to 2011. The SEDAR search interface is 
shown in Figure 2 below.
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FIGURE 2 SEDAR SEARCH INTERFACE
 
Source: Screen capture image from http://sedar.com/search/search_form_pc_en.htm 
SEDAR includes a feature that links companies that have merged or changed names. This 
allowed me to expand the sample to include previous incarnates, parents, or companies 
absorbed by the company included in the original list. That is, if a company on the original 
list was created from one or more previous companies, the previous companies were added 
to the original list and I collected compensation data on them as Ill. Through this process, 
an additional 52 companies were added to the list for a total of 172 companies. 
I downloaded all the available proxy circulars for each company and reviewed each 
document for the required information on stock option awards to the NEOs for each 
company. In order to easily analyze the information, it was carefully transcribed into a 
database. Of the 172 original companies, 24 companies did not grant options during the 
sample period.12 This left a total of 149 companies with stock option grants.13 
Step 2: Data Verification 
It is important for the conclusions that the information reported in the annual information 
circular is as accurate as possible. This requires me to verify the reported information in a 
number of ways.
As previously noted, the information circular reports all stock option grants for NEOs for 
the reporting period, but an individual may not have been a NEO, and hence possibly not 
an insider, for the whole reporting period. I carefully scrutinize information in the proxy for 
12 
I also excluded any option grants award during periods where the company operated as income trusts. I eliminated these 
periods where a company operated as an income trust as a precautionary measure because, for these entities, it is difficult 
to distinguish between grants of rights and grants of options. Treating a grant of rights as a grant of options could result in 
mistakenly interpreting an award as misfiled.
13 
Due to the sensitive nature of this research and since the focus of this paper is on insider and not issuer compliance, I do not 
disclose the companies, sectors or jurisdictions from which the companies were selected.
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information related to the date the insider became a NEO. In cases where the information 
is not clear or not provided, I checked the SEDI system for the date an individual became 
a reporting insider14 or scrutinize the OSCB bulletins for any relevant information. Option 
grants to individuals who were not a reporting insider at the time of a proxy-reported option 
grant were removed from the sample. This is a necessary step to ensure that an award 
that is not required to be filed is not erroneously treated as being not filed for disclosure 
purposes.
As my interest is in insider reporting behaviour, consistently using the same name for 
an insider throughout the sample is important. However, in the SEDAR reports, how an 
individual’s name is reported can vary across time and across companies. For example, an 
individual’s name can change as their marital status changes or an issuer may list insider 
names by initials, using just first and last name, or by using the insider’s full name. I do a 
careful review of insider names and use the SEDI system along with Google searches to 
ensure that I consistently identify the same insider across the sample period.
As detailed previously, the information circular contains additional information that will be 
helpful in the matching process. I record any information regarding stock splits, currency 
information, and other related details that could result in information reported in the annual 
circular report being different from that reported by the insider, and make any necessary 
adjustments to the reported information. 
I also record any relevant information about the stock option plan, including how the 
exercise price of the option is determined (e.g., closing price of stock traded on the TSX the 
day before the option was granted) and the expiration period of stock option awards. This 
information is used in the verification steps that follow.
First, in a number of cases, the company reported a range for the expiration dates (e.g., Aug. 
22, 2009-2011) associated with a stock option award, suggesting, but not clearly stating, 
that the expiration date for the option grant was laddered. A review of the stock option plan 
determined that the options vested in set tranches and the vest options expired after a set 
period from the vesting date. Unfortunately, due to the reporting, I am unable to determine 
what amount of options within the award expired with which date. I record all the relevant 
information to help with the matching and verification process. 
Second, if a NEO leaves a company during a reporting year and after being awarded 
stock options, the option award will be reported in the annual proxy, but the expiration 
date attached to those options will likely not be the original one. That is because when a 
recipient of an option award leaves a company, the option plan usually requires that the 
options immediately vest and the expiration date reset to a prescribed period following 
the departure date (e.g., they expire one month after the departure). In these cases, the 
expiration date reported in the information circular will differ from that reported by the 
insider. As before, I record all the relevant information to help with the matching and 
verification process. 
Third, because the grant date is not required to be reported in the annual information 
circular against which the grant date reported by the insider can be checked, it will be 
14 
While some insiders accurately report the date they became an insider in the SEDI system, most either have no date 
reported or the date reported is the date the SEDI system became active. The lack of compliance with this reporting 
suggests that reporting this information is not policed by any of the Canadian securities regulators.
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necessary to use additional information to investigate the accuracy of grant dates which 
insiders are required to report. As noted above, the annual circular contains information 
on the reporting period along with information on the issuer’s stock option plan, notably 
the rules used to price the option awards and the rules regarding the expiration of option 
awards. This information, along with using the issuer’s stock data,15 can be used to 
attempt to verify grant dates reported by insiders.16 I test my proposed method of using the 
information regarding the issuer’s stock option plan along with all the information provided 
for the stock option grants and the issuer’s stock data to impute a grant date for those 
options, where a grant date is reported in the annual information circular, and compare the 
dates. I am able to confidently impute the grant date reported in the annual proxy for nearly 
every option award.17 I then use this method to impute the grant dates for the remaining 
grants and am able to confidently impute the grant date for most awards.18 
Information on Stock Option Awards Contained in the Insider Reports
My objective is to compare the information on stock option awards in the proxy circulars to 
the information provided by insiders through ID and to record any inconsistencies. There 
are two sources of information for insider reports. Insider reports filed before June 9, 2003 
were all paper-based. While these original paper-based filings can be obtained directly from 
the appropriate securities regulator, they can only be obtained at a significant cost. Instead, 
the information contained in these insider reports can be obtained from the weekly OSCB. 
In theory, the data in the bulletins contain all the information provided by the insider in 
the paper-based report, except that the bulletins omit the date the reports were received by 
the OSC (i.e., the actual filing date). Consequently, I am unable to investigate compliance 
with filing deadlines in the OSCB filing regime, but I can still examine the disclosure 
15 
I obtained the stock data for each issuer from the Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (CFMRC) database. The 
CFMRC includes both listed and de-listed TSX-listed companies. 
16 
I had hoped that I could simply impute grant dates from the information provided in the annual proxy without using 
additional information, but I found doing so to be very difficult. There are several reasons for this. First, nearly all option 
plans set a minimum pricing rule and a maximum expiration rule, meaning that any number of grant dates could fit the 
stipulated rules. Second, many option plans use complex pricing schemes based on weighted or unweighted averages of the 
issuer’s stock price with some even converted into the USD, which are difficult to definitively replicate. Third, many stock 
option plans do not provide detailed information about the pricing rules. Notably, the stock option plans simply indicate 
that the stock option award would be priced at the “market price.” However, there is no one unique definition of market 
price. The market price can be calculated based on the most recent closing price, the closing price on the day before an 
award, the high or low price of the stock, or the average of a set of price or weighted prices. Hence, simply stating “market 
price” provides no additional information with which to impute a grant date. Fourth, it became clear that issuers are not 
consistently following their own rules. For example, issuers who indicated that they used some sort of average of the stock 
price to calculate an award’s exercise price appeared to use the closing price instead for some option grants, assuming the 
expiration rule was followed. Finally, some stock option awards are made during an active trading day and some are not 
made until after the markets close on the grant date. In the former case, it usually means the trading day stock data are 
not used to calculate the stock option award’s exercise price, while in the latter, the trading day stock date may be used to 
calculate the option award’s exercise price. Because it is not known from the information provided what the case may be 
for any given stock option award, it can mean that any imputed grant date could be off by one or more days (in the case of a 
weekend award) if market prices are similar in this range.
17 
It appears in nine cases, which represent two separate awards to all the NEOs, the discrepancy is due to a typo in the proxy 
report as the imputed grant date accords with the information provided in the stock option plan as Ill as the grant date 
reported by the insider. In one case, the grant date reported in the proxy was Feb. 14, whereas the imputed date was Feb. 24. 
In another case, the grant date reported in the proxy was June 24, whereas the imputed date was June 4.
18 
Awards where my method will have difficulty in imputing a grant date are those that are priced not-at-the-money, where 
the exercise price was converted from or to non-Canadian currency, or where the expiration date is set using a rule that is 
not based on a full calendar year from the grant date (e.g., the option award expires at the end of a calendar year rather than 
based on the date of the option award).
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delay based on the publication date of the OSCB bulletins. In addition, there are many 
steps where the paper-based insider reports could be lost, data not inputted or transmitted, 
or a data entry error made. Any finding that suggests the insider filings during the OSCB 
period were not filed or the data in those filings were incorrect does not necessarily mean 
that the insider is at fault. It could instead mean that the data published in the OSCB are not 
accurate.19 
Insider reports filed on or after June 9, 2003 can be obtained directly from SEDI. In this 
case, the reports are directly filed by the insider or their designate, so any omissions or 
inaccuracies are directly attributable to the insider or their designate. Insider reports on 
SEDI can be accessed through multiple channels which I exploit. I first searched for stock 
option grant filings by issuer name. If I was unable to locate an insider report by issuer 
name, which occurred in a number of cases, I then searched by insider name, using a 
variety of input options. If this did not produce a match, which did occur in some cases, I 
removed the limit to search only across option grants. By pursuing an exhaustive search 
process on SEDI, I ensure I do not omit a filing that, for technical reasons, does not appear 
in more narrowly defined searches. In addition to recording information related to the 
filing of the option award, I also look to determine if any filings are amended and what 
information is amended, and also record this information.
As was the case with the issuer reports, in collecting the data from the insider reports 
I discovered that insiders were not consistent in how they report laddered stock option 
awards. These are option awards where different tranches of options within an award have 
different expiration dates. In some cases, insiders report these as one award and either do 
not report an expiration date or use either their earliest or latest expiration date. In other 
cases, insiders file a report for each of the tranches. While the latter is the technically 
correct reporting process, the former leads to finding option awards that were not reported 
that technically were reported. I err on the side of caution and if a laddered grant is reported 
as one award, I accept that as a disclosed award. 
V. RESULTS
Summary Statistics
The data collection and verification process using the issuer’s information circulars yields 
data on 3,955 option awards to 981 different NEOs employed by 149 companies that were 
listed on the TSX over the period 1996-2011. Approximately 29 per cent of the awards are 
to the CEO, 19 per cent to the CFO, and the remaining 51 per cent to VPs and other senior 
officers. In the majority of the cases (89 per cent), a stock option grant is awarded to more 
than one NEO at the same time. The most common type of award (55 per cent) is one that is 
provided to all NEOs.
19 
In an effort to determine the OSCB’s degree of accuracy, I obtained copies of the paper filings from the OSC for insider 
reports for 241 option awards granted by three companies and filed prior to the launch of SEDI. I cross-checked the paper 
filings against the OSCB and was surprised to find that 38 per cent of the option awards that were duly reported to the 
OSC by insiders were never published in the OSCB. The missing filings appear to be clustered around specific bulletins, 
suggesting technical problems rather than a systemic problem.
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In terms of the stock option award information that is available in the annual proxy reports, 
compliance with the reporting requirements is quite high. In all cases, the number of 
securities associated with the stock option award is reported and the average number of 
shares granted per option award was 145,852. In all but 11 cases, the exercise price of the 
option award is reported.20 With respect to the option awards expiration date, in all but 18 
cases the expiration date of the option award is reported.21 Finally, in terms of voluntarily 
providing information, 44 per cent of the awards report the market price of the underlying 
stock on the date the grant is reported,22 and for nearly 18 per cent of the awards, the option 
grant date is reported.23 
Figure 3 displays the distribution of the number of stock awards by year and regime over 
my sample period. Of the 3,955 awards, 20 per cent were granted before and 80 per cent 
after the SEDI filing regime was put in place. This distribution is not unexpected given 
how the sample of companies was defined (companies listed on the TSX listed as of 
December 2010) and the volatility of companies listed on the TSX at any point of time. The 
distribution may also be caused by the fact that stock option awards increased in popularity 
over my sample period.
In the introduction, a number of questions were set out to be explored in this paper and 
these questions guide the remaining presentation of the results. Do insiders file their insider 
reports? Are their filings timely? Are their insider reports accurate? Have recent changes to 
reporting requirements made any difference in compliance rates?
20 
Ten of the 11 cases where the exercise price is not reported are for the same company and occur in two consecutive years 
(2002 and 2003). The company properly reports all information in previous and subsequent years. In the remaining case, the 
award occurs in the first reporting year of the company, and information is properly reported in subsequent years.
21 
11 of the cases correspond to those where the exercise price was also not reported. In the remaining seven cases, the original 
option expiration date was not reported. Instead, the date reported corresponded to a revised expiration date due to the 
insider leaving their position with the company, or the company’s stock option plan was terminated after a take-over or 
merger. Because it was not the original expiration date, the date is not recorded in the database. 
22 
Interestingly, through the process of imputing the grant date, I found that in a number of cases the reported market price 
does not accord with any plausible definition of the market price of the underlying stock. This is an interesting finding and 
worthy of follow-up in future work.
23 
Nine issuers always report the option grant date and 20 report the grant date for some of their options. This means that 81per 
cent of issuers never report the option grant date in their annual proxy. Only 9.1 per cent of awards report both the market 
price and the grant date.
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FIGURE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF STOCK OPTION AWARDS BY YEAR, 1996-2001
Do Insiders File the Required Reports?
I begin by examining the extent of public disclosure. That is, do insiders file the required 
reports at all? I find that 12 per cent of awards are not publicly disclosed outside of the 
issuer’s annual information circular. In terms of filing behaviour by position, nearly 10 per 
cent of stock option awards to CEOs, nine per cent to CFOs, and 15 per cent to VPs go 
unfiled. In terms of filing behaviour associated with type of award, an insider’s only or first 
award (as it appears in my data set) has a higher incidence of being unfiled at 22 per cent 
and 19 per cent respectively, compared to around 10 per cent for subsequent, including an 
insider’s final, awards, as shown in Figure 4.
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FIGURE 4 PERCENTAGE OF STOCK OPTION AWARDS NOT FILED BY AWARD SEQUENCE
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Further, the proportion of awards not filed decreases with the number of NEOs receiving 
the same stock option award. When only one NEO receives an award, 25 per cent of those 
awards go unfiled, but that drops to only nine per cent when all the NEOs receive an award, 
as shown in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5 PERCENTAGE OF STOCK OPTION AWARDS NOT FILED BY NUMBER OF NEOS RECEIVING AWARD
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In terms of individuals’ filing behaviour, 26 per cent of insiders have at least one option 
award that goes unreported and nearly eight per cent of insiders never file a single option 
grant. If I look more closely at insiders’ filing behaviour, as shown in Figure 6, I see that 
most insiders who fail to file mostly only do so once, but that a concerning minority are 
fairly regular non-filers.
FIGURE 6 DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF AWARDS NOT FILED BY INDIVIDUAL INSIDERS
In terms of how non-filing has changed over time, for those stock options granted during 
the OSCB filing regime, 30 per cent were never published in the OSCB. This means that 
under the old regime, nearly one-third of insider stock option awards were not publicly 
disclosed until the publication of the issuer’s proxy circular. As a reminder, this result 
cannot be interpreted as meaning these option grants were never reported to the OSC, given 
the possibility of publication errors. For those stock options granted during the SEDI filing 
regime, just over seven per cent of awards were never filed, a remarkable improvement in 
compliance. 
Figure 7 presents the distribution of the frequency of awards not disclosed by year and 
by reporting regime. The OSCB period is presented to the left and the SEDI period is 
presented to the right of the vertical line. There are several things to note from the figure. 
First, Figure 7 shows that public disclosure steadily improved over the OSCB regime, 
and that trend continued with the implementation of the SEDI filing system. Indeed, the 
percentage of awards not filed in a given year dropped to six per cent by 2005, where it 
has generally stayed. The exception to this is 2006 when over 14 per cent of awards were 
not filed and 2010 where over nine per cent of awards were not filed. Not only do the 
results indicate that moving to an online and real time filing regime likely streamlined 
19
the reporting requirements and was in and of itself an effective method to encourage 
more regular reporting, but also the results demonstrate that compliance with the filing 
requirements may have markedly improved.
FIGURE 7 DISTRIBUTION OF THE FREQUENCY OF AWARDS NOT DISCLOSED BY YEAR, 1996-2011
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It is important to remember, however, that the number of option awards in a given year 
grows steadily over the sample period. This means that while the percentage of awards 
not filed is shrinking, generally the raw number of awards not filed in a given year has 
not changed much over the sample period. In addition, since the initial transition phase to 
SEDI there has been little improvement to compliance, except for in 2011 when fewer than 
three per cent of awards were not filed, which represents a marked improvement in insider 
reporting. 
Is it possible that this trend in compliance was due to greater enforcement, which was 
a policy recommendation made by M&S (2010)? In an effort to answer this question, I 
obtain data from the Disciplined Persons Database. In that database, I find little evidence of 
increased enforcement. I find that only seven individuals have been sanctioned for failing 
to file in Quebec since March 28, 2007 and 88 individuals have been sanctioned in B.C. 
since Feb. 26, 1991. The punishments range depending on the number of counts of failure 
to report of which an individual is found guilty. Interestingly, in Quebec, the seven insiders 
sanctioned for failure to report were found liable only for failure to report; in B.C., most of 
the persons sanctioned for failure to report have also been sanctioned for other breaches.
One of the difficulties in interpreting the above results is the amount of overlap between the 
categories and determining which, if any effect, may be driving the observed trend. This 
arises because it is not unusual to grant a stock option award as part of the compensation 
package offered to a new NEO, so that only those new NEOs would get that option award, 
and that new NEO is more likely to be a VP. However, given that the results suggest that 
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most of the failure to file is the result of an insider’s first, and sometimes only, award, it 
suggests that there is a learning curve — or an initial failure to educate — associated with 
compliance with insider reporting obligations. This may be supported by the following 
finding: in reviewing the filings for those insiders who received more than one option award 
but who failed to file their first option award, I find that many of these insiders subsequently 
filed an opening insider report (which is required to be filed within 10 calendar days of 
first becoming an insider) sometime after the (unreported) stock option grant and that the 
opening report includes the number of options from the initial (unreported) stock option 
grant. 
Based on these results, I offer an important caveat about the displayed increase in 
compliance I report in Figure 7. The observed reduction in non-compliance could be solely 
due to sample issues, notably a lack of turnover in the insiders at my sample of companies 
in recent years which naturally reduces the number of insiders obtaining their “first” award, 
and not due to an overall increase in compliance. In examining my data, I see that the 
proportion of first awards steadily fell from around an average of 30 per cent to 15 per cent 
by 2011. This suggests that perhaps the impression first left by Figure 7, that compliance 
with the filing requirements may have markedly improved, is only partially true. That is, 
the observed increase in compliance rates can also be explained by the reduced proportion 
of first awards in the sample.
Do Insiders File the Required Reports on Time?
I now focus on the option awards that were filed. Of those option awards that are filed 
(3,482), I find that nearly 30 per cent of awards over the sample are either published or filed 
after the required disclosure date. That is, they are filed, or at least for the OSCB period 
published, late. 
In terms of who files late, there is no variation by insider position or by the number of 
NEOs who receive the award. I also find little variation by award sequence. The only award 
that has a higher probability of being filed late is an insider’s first award, with more than 46 
per cent of first awards being filed late. All other awards vary around the overall average 
of 30 per cent, except for an insider’s seventh and higher awards, which only have a 17 per 
cent chance of being filed late.
It is worthwhile to link this result of a significant proportion of first awards being filed late 
to the previous result, where it was found that a significant number of insiders who received 
multiple awards failed to file their first award, but who eventually filed an opening balance 
recognizing that award. Obviously, it is better from a disclosure perspective for an award 
to be filed late than never really filed in the first place. To the extent that some insiders are 
using the opening balance filing to avoid being tainted with a late filing, this behaviour is 
worrisome for achieving the goals of disclosure. 
As mentioned previously, insiders may designate an agent who can file on their behalf. It is 
possible for an issuer to designate such a person who files the reports on behalf of all NEOs. 
While there is no indicator in the insider filings of when this occurs, awards to multiple 
NEOs that are filed with the same information and on the same day may be filed by such 
a designate. Using this rough guideline, I do find that awards with such characteristics are 
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far less likely to be filed late. I find that 34 per cent of awards to only one NEO, and thus 
impossible to determine if a designate is being used, are filed late and 28 per cent of awards 
to multiple NEOs who do not appear to use a designate are filed late. In contrast, only 14 
per cent of awards to multiple NEOs that appear to be filed by a designate are filed late. In 
terms of late filing behaviour by individual insiders, more than 55 per cent of insiders have 
at least one option award that is filed late and more than 17 per cent of insiders never file on 
time. If I look more closely at the late filing behaviour of insiders, as shown in Figure 8, I 
see that most insiders who file late mostly only do so once, but that a concerning minority 
are fairly regular non-filers.
FIGURE 8 DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF AWARDS LATE-FILED BY INDIVIDUAL INSIDERS
In terms of how this has varied over the filing regimes, Table 2 shows that, unsurprisingly, 
timely disclosure significantly improved with SEDI’s advent. Using the OSCB period, 
nearly all of the awards were disclosed to the public after the required disclosure period. 
In comparison, for the SEDI period, only about 16 per cent of awards are filed late. While 
SEDI improved timely filings, the recent move to a five-day filing deadline did not result in 
a significant decrease in the proportion of awards that are filed late.
Not only did SEDI improve the rate of timely disclosure, but it also improved the time to  
disclosure. In looking at all option awards, the average number of days from grant date  
to publication or filing date steadily decreased from nearly 200 days to seven days. In  
looking at only those grants that are filed late, the average number of days from grant date  
to publication or filing date, the delay decreased from 209 days to 32 days. The results also 
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show that the range of days to disclosure has also improved. The longest delay in the OSCB 
period was over five years, whereas this decreased to just over three years in the initial 
SEDI period and now stands at just under one year. 
Could the increase in timely disclosure have been the result of increased enforcement? 
There is conflicting evidence that fines for late insider reports are effective. Late-filed 
insider reports dropped by 61 per cent the year following the introduction of the late filing 
fee in Quebec, suggesting they are effective. On the flip side, while Ontario collected 
$520,000 in fines for late insider reports, as noted by Compton et al. (2011, 485) “there are 
few reported cases of 
TABLE 2 PROPORTION OF OPTION AWARDS FILED LATE AND # OF DAYS TO FILING
Filing Deadline Regime % Published/Filed Late Mean # of Days from Grant 
Date to Published/Filing Date
[Min, Max] 
All Grants
Mean # of Days from Grant 
Date to Published/Filing Date
[Min, Max] 
Late Published/Filed Grants
10 calendar days from  
the end of the month
OSCB 94.7 199
[21, 1802]
209
[21, 1802]
10 calendar days  
from grant date
OSCB 98.6 110
[7, 1836]
112
[18, 1836]
10 calendar days  
from grant date
SEDI 17.4 18
[0, 1103]
78
[11, 1103]
5 calendar days  
from grant date
SEDI 15.3 7
[0, 323]
32
[6, 323]
enforcement actions brought against late filers except in conjunction with other more 
serious breaches of securities law.” Table 2 also shows that if a report is filed late, it is 
likely to be filed long after the required filing date. Once a report is late, there is little 
incentive for the insider to file their reports more quickly. This is likely a function of how 
the late filing penalty is calculated. As noted above, in Ontario, the penalty for late filing 
is a relatively modest fine of $50 per day and this fine is capped at a maximum of $1,000 
per issuer per year (Fees, OSC Rule 13-502, (2 April 2010), Appendix D (B)). The cap is 
reached once one award from a particular issuer is late by 20 days. The results suggest that 
the cap size and calculation need to be reconsidered if they are meant to curb late-filed 
reports. As a result, there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that late fines are driving the 
observed results. The improvements in late filing are welcome, but there still remain a large 
minority of awards that are filed late, a minority of insiders who repeatedly file late, and the 
disclosure delay is still impeding the ability of disclosure rules to achieve their objectives.
It could be that features of the option award itself may decrease the ability of an insider to 
be able to file their award on time. Notably, awards that are priced not using a trading price 
on the day of or day before an option award may result in late filings due to a delay in the 
insider being informed of an option award. In particular, it may be that the time needed to 
calculate a stock option awards exercise price when a five- , seven- or 10-day average is 
used may lead to an increase in late filings. Interestingly, the data show that options that are 
granted with an exercise price based on stock trading information from multiple days are 
significantly more likely to be filed on time than those priced using the trading price from 
the day of or day prior to the option grant. This is an interesting finding that is worthy of 
more detailed follow-up as the higher incidence of late filing of stock options priced using a 
simple pricing model could be evidence of backdating of stock options.
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Are Insider Reports Accurate?
The final thing to consider is whether insider reports are accurate; this includes examining 
the reports for missing required information along with mismatching information. I first 
consider if information from the insider reports is missing, ensuring that I account for the 
limited information available through the OSCB. I consider information to be missing from 
the report if the entry is blank or if zero is entered in lieu of informative data. I find that 
nearly 10 per cent of insider reports contain missing information, and that this is worse 
under the SEDI reporting system. Notably, only 3.3 per cent of OSCB reported awards have 
missing information, whereas 10.3 per cent of awards reported on the SEDI system have 
missing information.
In terms of the data that are missing, most of these cases involve the options expiration 
date. Since the OSCB does not report this information, these cases are all filed on the SEDI 
system. The remaining cases involve either the exercise price or, in one case, the number 
of options not being reported. If the expiration, exercise price and number of options are all 
considered required information, it is curious that the SEDI system would allow the report 
to be submitted either with missing information, or using zero when non-zero information 
is expected, rather than generating an error code that prompts the insider to fill in the 
missing information. In most cases where the expiration date is missing, these are laddered 
awards with different tranches of options having different expiration dates. Clearly, insiders 
are confused about how to file such awards and need guidance as to how to do so. 
In terms of inaccurate information, nearly 34 per cent of insider awards are filed with 
information that does not match that reported in the information circular. The proportion 
of awards filed with inaccurate information is higher on the SEDI system than the OSCB 
system. During the OSCB regime, 25 per cent of awards were inaccurate, whereas during 
the SEDI regime it is nearly 36 per cent. Most of this inaccuracy is due to mismatching 
expiration dates or the grant date. While a small proportion, there are insider reports that 
report the wrong exercise price, the number of options, and even the security designation in 
a handful of cases.
However, it is important to account for filing amendments before considering inaccuracies 
any further. Insiders can file amendments to the original filings to correct any information 
provided in the original filing. I find that approximately seven per cent of insider 
reports are amended after the initial filing, nearly all of which occurred after the SEDI’s 
implementation. This is likely due to the ease of an insider being able to check their original 
filing and the ease of filing an amendment on the SEDI system, rather than the original 
filings in the OSCB regime being more accurate. 
The most common information amended is the grant date, followed closely by the 
exercise price and expiration date. Interestingly, in some cases (one per cent) the original 
reported information matched that reported in, or that imputed by, using the stock option 
granting information in the information circular, meaning that the amended insider report 
is inaccurate. All of these cases involved either or both amending the grant date and 
the exercise price. It could be that insiders are erroneously filing amendments when an 
alternative filing (e.g., a repricing) is required. 
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While data input errors are to be expected, what is more concerning is the amount of time 
that potentially incorrect information remains public. A minority of these amendments are 
ones that occur on the same date as the original filing, but most occur long after the original 
filing: the average number of days between the original filing is nearly a year (338 days), 
and the longest gap between the two is over five years. Because the distribution is highly 
skewed, considering the median amendment delay is important, which is 105 days. If I only 
consider those insider reports where the amendment results in the reported information 
matching that in the information circular, the delay actually increases to an average of over 
a year, at 380 days, with the median being 140 days. This means that investors and others 
using disclosure information as it is intended to be used may be making decisions based on 
erroneous information that remains public for an extended period of time.
For the remainder of this section, I use the data that are corrected for the amended 
information, where the amendment does not result in initially correctly reported 
information being modified with incorrect information. Overall, I find that after correcting 
for amended information in this way, nearly 32 per cent of awards are inaccurate, with one-
sixth of these having more than one error. Table 3 shows how these errors are manifested 
across the categories. Misreporting the security designation is very rare. With respect 
to the 11 insider reports with an incorrect designation code, most codes are for different 
derivatives than options (e.g., rights, warrants, ownership) and this could be the result of 
simple confusion on the insider’s part or the result of the issuer’s information not properly 
disclosing the derivative in its table. 
An equally small proportion of insider reports misreport the number of securities and 
exercise price. In some cases, the error appears to be one of simple data entry, with 
numbers inverted or an extra zero added or omitted. With respect to the number of 
securities, a number of insider reports report a negative number of options granted despite 
the proper security designation of “Option Grant” being used. With respect to the exercise 
price, in some cases the difference is simply the result of the insider reporting a different 
number of decimal places than that reported in the issuer information circular. In most 
cases, there is no clear reason for the difference, but the frequency of these errors is fairly 
low.
Errors related to the grant and expiration date, however, are much more common. Nearly 
11 per cent of insider reports provide the wrong grant date and 22 per cent the wrong 
expiration date. With respect to the grant date, more than one-quarter of reports with errors 
are off by one day on either side of the grant. With respect to the expiration date, nearly 
half of reports with errors have the same feature. In these cases, I find that this may be the 
result of wrongly aligning the grant date with the expiration date. For many option awards, 
the expiration date is set as one day less the grant date sometime in the future. For example, 
the options are granted on Feb. 1, but they expire Jan. 31 as opposed to Feb. 1 sometime in 
the future. Some insiders seem to be confused by this and either change the grant date or 
expiration date to align with a full year.
However, in the majority of cases, the grant date is off by an order of magnitude. The 
average difference between the actual grant date and that reported by the insider is 49 days 
with the maximum difference being five years. The actual grant date of the stock option 
award is one of the most crucial pieces of information for the public. Why would an insider 
provide the wrong grant date? As noted by Compton et al. (2011, 481-482), it is possible 
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that the issuer does not inform some insiders of their awards in a timely manner. In such 
instances, and through no fault of their own, insiders are not able to file their insider reports 
in a timely fashion. Canadian securities commissions have a practice of allowing insiders 
to use the notification date as the grant date for the purpose of insider reporting.24 Doing so 
typically ensures that the insider is not reported as being a late filer.
TABLE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF ERRORS IN INSIDER REPORTS
Error % of all awards Mean
[Std. Dev]
Min & Max
Any Error 31.8%
Number of Errors 1.15
[0.38]
1, 3
Security Designation 0.3%
Number of Securities* 1.0% -89,139
[254,155]
-1000000, 100000
Exercise Price* 2.6% -10.59
[16.85]
-58.59, 0.71
Grant Date* 10.9% 48.42
[157.2]
-357, 1826
Expiration Date* 21.9% 8.71
[864.75]
-3686, 3513
*  Denotes mean and minimum/maximum reported is the difference, calculated by taking the amount reported by the 
insider and subtracting that reported in the issuer information circular.
The practice of allowing insiders to use the notification date in place of the grant date 
has two consequences. First, the number of reports that are filed on time is overstated. 
Securities regulations require that insider reports be filed within a narrow window from the 
grant date. Insiders who use the notification date in lieu of the grant date may appear to file 
in a timely fashion when they have not in fact met the requirement under the legislation. 
Second, the public is provided with incorrect information. The notification date may be 
within a few days of the grant date, but it can also be weeks, months or even years after 
the actual grant date. The grant can appear to be either in-the-money (where the exercise 
price is below stock price on the “grant” date) which violates TSX exchange rules (TMX, 
2010, 11) or out-of-the money (where the exercise price is above the stock price on the 
“grant” date) which gives it the appearance of a performance-based award rather than a 
compensation-based award. 
24 
As noted previously, the grant date of an award is that date when the legal steps necessary to authorize the issue of the 
options (including necessary stock exchange approvals, if any) have been completed. Once these steps are completed, the 
recipient must then be notified of the grant. Legal notification of an option award can come either with or without a grant 
date. If the notice has a grant date on it, then the officer must file the insider report within 10 days of that grant date. What 
happens if the notice does not have a grant date? CSA Staff Notice 55-308 (n.d.: repealed in 2010) contained the following 
response to “When do I need to report options I acquired under a company stock plan?”: 
 
You need to report the grant of stock options because you have acquired securities of the company. You need to report 
the grant within 10 calendar days of the date you legally acquire ownership of a specific number of options, i.e., the date 
indicated as the date of grant or if no date is given, the date you are notified of your specific allotment. If the grant is 
subject to approval by a stock exchange, then the date of grant can be no earlier than the date exchange approval is granted. 
The date the board of directors of the issuer merely authorizes the grant of options is not the date from which you calculate 
your requirement to report your grant.” (p.11) (Emphasis added.)
 
CSA Staff Notice 55-308 was replaced by Questions and Answers on Insider Reporting and the System for Electronic 
Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI), CSA Staff Notice 55-316 [CSA Staff Notice 55-316] , which did not include a similar question 
and answer, so it is unclear if this is still accepted practice.
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In the remaining case, the expiration date is off by an order of magnitude. In a number of 
cases, the insider seemed to erroneously provide the grant date in place of the expiration 
date. In other cases, the error may be the result of a laddered grant. However, it is difficult 
to provide clear explanations for many of the errors. It could be that there is an underlying 
strategic reason for the misreporting and that possibility is worthy of more detailed follow-up.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The methodology, data collection and results detailed above lead to a number of 
recommendations which can not only improve disclosure under the current rules, but also 
the ability of securities regulators to monitor and enforce compliance with the existing 
disclosure rules. I show that the approach of using third-party reporting and data matching 
to investigate compliance with disclosure rules is a viable methodology due to the presence 
of both insider and continuous disclosure in Canada. However, the continuous disclosure 
requirements along with the nature of the databases where this information is available 
pose significant barriers to this work. Dismantling these barriers, however, serves multiple 
purposes, including providing shareholders with more detailed information regarding 
NEO compensation, increasing the ease at which compliance can be investigated, and 
streamlining issuer and insider reporting. In addition, the results show that education on the 
disclosure rules is needed as is a detailed consideration of the filing requirements and rules.
1. Change the Reporting Template in the Issuer Information Circular
Since 2008, the securities regulators have stipulated the template in which the issuers must 
disclose stock option awards in their annual information circular. The template, however, 
impedes transparency. Greater transparency can easily be achieved by small modifications 
to the template, requiring the issuer to report the grant date, and removing the limit to 
disclose only unexercised options. This information is readily known and requiring it to 
be provided does not impose a significant burden. Indeed, issuers often volunteered this 
information prior to 2008. 
In addition, consideration should be given to requiring the issuer to provide the stock’s 
market price on the date of the grant award. This information should be supported with 
footnotes to the table as to how exactly the exercise price and the market price were 
calculated. As mentioned, while issuers are required to report and follow their general stock 
option pricing method in the circular, this information is overly generic for determining the 
exact pricing method used for any given stock option award, meaning that it is difficult to 
determine compliance with the shareholder-approved stock option plan. Finally, the issuer 
should be required to report in the summary compensation table the date each NEO became 
or ceased to be a NEO. While the SEDI system requires this information to be reported, 
few insiders actually provide it. As the disclosure rules are based on the insider and NEO 
status of an individual, it seems important that this information be provided.
It is also plain that issuers are not clear or consistent in how they report laddered stock 
option awards in their proxy reports, suggesting that issuers also need better and clearer 
guidance in this area. In reviewing the disclosure manuals provided by the securities 
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agencies, I find no clear direction on reporting requirements of such option awards. Clear 
guidance regarding the reporting of more complex stock options grants appears to be 
needed and will assist in more informative continuous disclosure. Equally, similarly clear 
guidance needs to be provided to insiders who also struggle to properly report such option 
awards.
Further, the issuer could be obligated to provide information regarding its NEOs’ 
compliance with disclosure rules. For each issuer, the number of NEOs for which it 
would have to provide this information is fairly insignificant, amounting to about five 
people a year, depending on turnover. Such a compliance table would serve to be not only 
informative to shareholders, but also to the securities regulators, as it provides simple 
digestible information to inform audit and compliance activities. Compiling such a table 
would be much simpler for the issuer if it were responsible for the insider filings, a point I 
return to below.
Such minor changes to issuer reporting not only provide important information to 
shareholders to ensure they are fully informed on the compensation to the issuer’s 
NEOs, but also provides important information to the securities regulator so as to inform 
and investigate compliance with disclosure rules. The former is important given the 
proliferation of “say on pay” initiatives and the latter is important for ensuring disclosure 
achieves its objectives. Indeed, it seems quite efficient to ensure that continuous disclosure 
achieves these multiple objectives given the low cost of doing so.
2. Improve the Continuous Disclosure Database
SEDAR, the continuous disclosure database, was launched in 1996 and appears to operate 
in the same way, 20 years later. This archaic reporting system now works to hinder 
anyone wanting to access and use the information available on this website. Notably, the 
requirement to submit PDF versions of documents, along with the search tool being limited 
to only being able to access the information issuer, significantly limits the usefulness 
of the information reported to the database. In fact, it could be argued that the SEDAR 
system provides little benefit over dissemination by a town crier. After all, data that are 
difficult and (time) costly to access impede the sole purpose of disclosure: that of informing 
investors, broadly defined.
While modernizing the SEDAR database may require some investment on the part of the 
securities regulators, it can be worth the cost if proper thought is given to aligning the 
database to also satisfy audit compliance activities. If at a minimum, the summary and 
stock option compensation tables were available in machine-readable data, this would 
provide significant benefits to shareholders, investors, securities regulators, journalists and 
other researchers. It would also be beneficial if the data were more easily and generally 
searchable and downloadable. Finally, despite the important tandem nature of both insider 
and continuous disclosure, the two databases (SEDI and SEDAR) are not linked. This is 
unfortunate, as linking the information can streamline insider filing requirements, increase 
compliance with insider disclosure, and improve the audit and compliance function of the 
securities regulators. 
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For example, if the issuer is required to provide the date that an individual becomes a NEO, 
which necessarily means the individual is an insider, then this information can be linked 
to the individual’s SEDI profile and auto-filled upon issuer submission. Further, the issuer 
disclosure of an insider stock option award can be immediately linked to an insider’s SEDI 
profile, providing an immediate cross check and a flag generated if the information is not 
provided or differs from what the insider provided. In short, linking the databases can 
automate compliance checks, thereby reducing audit costs for the securities authorities. 
Linking in such a manner would also aid the aforementioned recommendation that issuers 
provide information in their annual proxy statements about compliance with disclosure 
rules, thereby reducing the costs on issuers for such a requirement, which may reduce 
backlash to such a reporting requirement.
3. Improve the Insider Disclosure Database
While the SEDI system is leaps and bounds a better interface than the SEDAR database, 
there is much room for improvement. Much like the SEDAR system, the search tool is 
limited, requiring you to search either by issuer or insider as opposed to more generally, 
such as over a time frame. The SEDI system also has a frustrating report limit. That is, 
it can only provide so many reports in one search and many larger companies exceed its 
limits. When the limit is exceeded, you must limit your searches to SEDI-digestible chunks 
to view the information. This is an unnecessary limitation in this era of computer power 
and Internet bandwidth.
In addition, it is concerning that the same information can often not be located through 
independent searches of issuer and insider. The fact that many insiders are not properly 
linked to their issuer is problematic for disclosure. It is equally concerning that insiders are 
not being required to fill in key information like the date they became or ceased to be an 
insider. 
The SEDI system also allows insider reports that do not meet basic criteria. SEDI continues 
to allow insiders to file opening reports that have a positive balance, allowing some 
individuals to circumvent proper and full disclosure of awards. SEDI also allows reports 
to be filed that omit required information. As previously noted, regulation requires that 
SEDI reports include expiration and grant dates, price and number of options. Therefore, 
failing to include any of this information represents improper disclosure. When information 
is missing from SEDI reports, transparency and efficiency are weakened. Undisclosed 
information may dilute investor confidence, leading to reduced market efficiency. 
Alternatively, it might make it difficult for authorities to recognize improper trading. A 
missing price, for example, makes it all but impossible to recognize inconsistencies between 
stock data and grant date information. As discussed, reporting regulations are in place 
to ensure continued efficiency and market growth as Ill so as to deter improper trading. 
Incomplete information in filings threatens these goals. Finally, SEDI allows reports to be 
filed that have obvious errors, including entering the number zero when a non-zero entry is 
expected, allowing a negative number to be imputed for the number of securities associated 
with a stock option award, and expiration dates that pre-date the awards grant date. All of 
these issues can easily be addressed by simple changes in the SEDI data interface which 
does not allow reports with these characteristics to be submitted.
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4. Improve Insider and Issuer Education
The results make it clear that failure to file and late filing are highly associated with an 
insider’s first award. This result suggests that simply increasing fines and punishments 
for non- and late-filing may not be the most effective avenue for increasing filing and 
improving timely filing. Instead, the results suggest there is room for increased clarity 
regarding insiders’ obligations. This includes a focus on education regarding the opening 
insider report and the importance of filing every award, even their first award. Companies 
appear to be in the best position to educate their insiders on their reporting requirements, 
particularly since they know when a person becomes an insider and when these insiders 
receive awards. Issuers also need to be informed of the obligation to educate their insiders, 
ensure their insiders comply with the disclosure rules, and that they themselves comply 
with continuous disclosure. Such education could include a required online self-paced class 
for all new insiders and issuers to complete. This course could be linked to the SEDI filing 
requirements so that a report cannot be filed until the course is completed.
5. Shift Filing Onus
In conjunction with, or alternatively to, insider education, companies might be encouraged 
to file reports on behalf of their insiders, thereby eliminating the concern that an executive 
could fail to file due to inexperience or lack of knowledge about requirements. After all, 
it is found that options awards that appear to be reported by an agent are less likely to 
be misfiled. As noted by Compton et al. (2009, 388-389) “the company possess all the 
information concerning the grant of stock options to insiders and therefore is better placed 
to ensure that all such grants are reported on a timely and accurate basis” (Compton et al. 
2009, 388-389). Moving to such a regime could improve the timeliness of disclosure as 
companies can file the reports almost immediately upon granting the options.
Additionally, issuers could be required to issue a public press release on the day of any 
option grant as is required in the U.S. and for companies listed on the TSX Venture 
exchange. A public press release is a low-cost way of ensuring immediate, publicly 
available information about insider stock option awards. 
6. Apply Penalties
Some individuals are chronic non-filers and more file sporadically. Both actions suggest a 
disregard for the regulations as Ill as the rationale for insider disclosure. Financial penalties 
should apply to chronic non-, late and erroneous filers. The penalties should be structured 
so that the maximum cap on them does not exacerbate the filing problems, and structured 
to correlate to the degree of the infraction. For example, penalties could be increased for 
multiple late-filers and/or for the length of the delay in filing.25 However, for such fines to 
be effective they must be enforced; yet, fines and penalties tend to be imposed only as part 
of enforcement actions that also involve more serious breaches of securities law. It could be 
25 
For example, the Income Tax Act contains a number of graduated fines or penalties for late-filed information or for multiple 
infractions of the same requirement. See, for example, the various penalties set out in section 162 of the Act. Subsection 
162(7.01), provides various financial penalties of a dollar amount per day multiplied by the number of days that the required 
information is reported late (subject to a cap). 
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argued that more serious breaches could be minimized if more effective action were taken 
on lesser breaches, such as failing to file an insider report. Regular cross checks between 
company records and insider filings, perhaps even requiring the companies to conduct these 
cross checks, could provide a simple way to enforce the rules and to take the appropriate 
action to curb non-compliant behaviour.
7.  Revise Practice of Allowing Insiders to use the Notification Date for 
the Grant Date
As was noted, a concerning minority of insider reports report a grant date that is at odds 
with the issuer’s information. It was discovered that the securities regulators allow insiders 
to use the notification date in place of the grant date, despite the clear implications for 
the objectives of disclosure. The incorrect reporting of the grant date can be overcome in 
several ways. First, current securities policy simply states that the issuer must inform the 
insider of a stock option award in a “timely manner” but this is not enshrined in legislation. 
Securities legislation could be revised to require issuers to notify insiders of stock option 
awards within a specified short time period. For example, the U.K. requires that insiders 
be notified within two trading days. Since Canadian insiders are currently required to file 
their report within five calendar days of the grant, a two-day notification period should 
permit timely filing. Second, the SEDI system could be modified to include entry of the 
notification date in addition to the grant date, and the notification date used to determine if 
a report is filed late. The simplest solution, however, seems to be one that was previously 
listed: require the issuer to file the insider report when a stock option is awarded, as is done 
in the U.K. and Australia. National Instrument 55-104 already gives issuers the option to 
file stock-based compensation reports on behalf of insiders and the timeliness and accuracy 
of reports tend to improve under such a system. Again, it is the issuer who holds perfect 
information about the option awards.
8. Detailed Consideration of the Filing Requirements and Rules
Of course, the recommendations above are based on the assumption that the existing 
disclosure requirements and rules are desirable. This study simply investigates compliance 
with the existing disclosure rules and makes note of where there are compliance issues 
with these existing rules. It may be worthwhile for the securities regulators to potentially 
first consider if the existing rules themselves need to be revised, given their objectives and 
given how the market has changed over the last 20 years. For example, is all the information 
that is required to be disclosed informative to these objectives? Is more or less information 
desirable? Is more timely disclosure important and if so to whom? And how can we ensure 
compliance with all the disclosure rules? Should compliance be better embedded in the 
system?
VII. CONCLUSION
Missing, late and misleading insider reports have been, and continue to be, roadblocks 
to achieving the goals of reporting requirements. The good news is that late and non-
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filed awards appear to have diminished over time, particularly with the launch of the 
SEDI reporting system. The bad news is that reports with errors and omissions of data 
have not diminished over time or with the advent of SEDI. In fact, errors and omissions 
increased with the SEDI reporting system. Based on the results detailed above, a number 
of recommendations are made which cannot only improve disclosure, but also the ability 
of securities regulators to monitor and enforce compliance with the disclosure rules. The 
results also point to fruitful avenues of future research including more detailed analysis of 
non-, late and misfiled awards, and options award timing practices, including whether the 
underlying trends point to more strategic behaviour than the descriptive statistics show. 
This includes examining issuers’ characteristics and their insider compliance, and whether 
underlying poor disclosure is more strategic, and possibly nefarious, behaviour. 
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Jennifer Winter and Sarah Dobson | June 2016
INFRASTRUCTURE, ATTITUDE AND WEATHER: TODAY’S THREATS TO SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/infrastructureattitudeandweather.pdf
Stephen Blank | June 2016
THE DISABILITY TAX CREDIT: WHY IT FAILS AND HOW TO FIX IT
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/disability-tax-credits-simpson-stevens.pdf
Wayne Simpson and Harvey Stevens | June 2016
TAX-ASSISTED APPROACHES FOR HELPING CANADIANS MEET OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTH-CARE COSTS
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/health-care-costs-emery.pdf
J.C. Herbert Emery | June 2016
PLANNING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE TO REALIZE CANADA’S POTENTIAL: THE CORRIDOR CONCEPT
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/northern-corridor-sulzenko-fellows.pdf
Andrei Sulzenko and G. Kent Fellows | May 2016
SHRINKING THE NEED FOR HOMELESS SHELTER SPACES
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/homeless-shelter-spaces-kneebone-wilkins.pdf
Ron Kneebone and Margarita Wilkins | May 2016
